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INSURANCE
WHAT Is PERMANENT DISABILITY?
The plaintiff held an insurance contract containing a clause requir-
ing the insurer to pay monthly benefits upon proof, three months after
beginning of a total disability, that the insured's disability was total and
permanent. Plaintiff submitted a written statement by his doctor to that
effect. The insurance company, acting on the advice of their physician,
refused to make any payments, claiming that the disability of the plaintiff
was temporary. Plaintiff's petition showed that at the time of suit the
disability had ceased and he had resumed a gainful occupation. Held,
the insurer is liable for the stipulated payments from the date of incep-
tion of the injury to the date of recovery, even though the insured
recovered completely before any payments were made. The court con-
cluded from a provision in the contract calling for payments only during
the continuance of the disability that both parties had in contemplation
a period of disability less than life. The decision is based on the idea
that the date of filing proof must be made the pivotal date in determin-
ing the probable duration of the disability in order to eliminate the strong
incentive for an insurer to resort to dilatory tactics and litigation in the
hope that lapse of time may convert the seemingly permanent disability
into a temporary one. Wright v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 58 Ohio
App. 83, 15 N.E. (2d) 970 (1937).
In an almost identical fact situation the court in another Ohio case
allowed the plaintiff to recover on the ground that "permanent" in such
a policy means indefinite and for an indeterminate time. Equitable Life
Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Gerwick, 50 Ohio App. 277, 3 Ohio Ops. 572, I8
Ohio L. Abs. 152 (1934). Prior to these two cases the law of Ohio
on the meaning of permanent in such a clause was embodied in Rose v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 127 Ohio St. 265, 187 N.E. 859 (I933).
That case was decided on the ground that proof was not submitted
during the continuance of the disability. The court stated by way of
dictum that if cessation of disability prior to payments can be shown, no
payments need be made.
While the question of whether total permanent disability is to be
confined to a disability lasting until death depends very largely upon the
phraseology of the policy involved in the particular case, the tendency in
recent cases is to give the word "permanent" a construction favorable to
the insured. In accord with the principal case it has been decided that
probable duration of the disability must be determined as of the date of
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claim. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noe, 161 Tenn. 335, 31 S.W.
(2d) 689 (1930). Hence, the disability must be present at the time of
claim. Rose v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra; Mackenzie v. Equitable
Life .lssur. Soc., 140 Misc. Rep. 665, 251 N.Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct.
1931). Courts which make the date of claim the focal point say that a
subsequent recovery even before trial will not destroy the cause of action.
Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 188 Minn. 139, 246 N.W. 737
(933); Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 16o Ga. 168, 127 S.E.
140 (1925); Grafe v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W. (2d)
400 (MO. 1935). Contra: Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 237 N.Y.
554, 143 N.E. 740 (1923); but notice that in that case the plaintiff
was asking substantial benefits under a disability provision for which the
stated premium was only forty-four cents. That the amount of the
premium will be considered in determining the extent of the liability
contemplated by the parties is evidenced by Lewis v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 142 So. 262 (La. App. 1932); Hawkins v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Iowa 760, 218 N.W. 313 (1928). Another
evidence that the parties used the word "permanent" in its strict sense
is a provision calling for payment of a lump sum by the insurer on proof
of a permanent disability. Home Benefit -4ss'n. v. Brown, 16 S.W.
(2d) 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Paul v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co.,
228 Mo. App. 124, 52 S.W. (2d) 437, 440 (1932). On the other
hand a clause calling for the payment of benefits only during the con-
tinuance of the disability carries the implication that the parties consid-
ered a "permanent" disability one which might cease at some time in
the future. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Preston, 253 Ky. 459, 70
S.W. (2d) I8 (1934). Such a clause is said to qualify the provision
limiting indemnity to permanent disability, Wenstrom v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 55 N.D. 647, 2 15 N.W. 93 (1927), so that permanent could
not be said to be used in the extreme sense of lifelong, Jefferson Stand-
ard Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 254 Ky. 603, 72 S.W. (2d) 20 0934);
Plummer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 132 Me. 220, 169 At. 302
(1933), but is intended to mean a condition which will in all probability
continue for a long and indefinite period of time. Gardon v. New Eng.
Mutual Le Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 1094, 254 N.W. 287 (934); Equit-
able Life Ins. Co. v. Preston, supra; .damson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 42 Ga. App. 587, 157 S.E. 104 (1930).
Where the insurance contract calls for a presumption that a disability
continuing for a specified time is permanent, a claim against the insurer
arises for the period from the date of disability to the date of recovery
on the expiration of the prescribed period. Losnecki v. Mutual Life Ins.
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Co., I06 Super. Ct. 259, 161 Ad. 434 (1932). The presumption so
provided for is not rebuttable by proof of later recovery. Heralds of
Liberty v. Jones, 142 Miss. 735, 107 So. 519 (1926); Dietlin v. Mo.
State Life Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. I5, 14 Pac. (2d) 331 (1932).
Contra: Mitchell v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 205 N.C. 721, 172
S.E. 497 (934); Graham v. Equitable Life Assur. SOC., 221 Iowa
748, 266 N.W. 82o (1936). The usual requirement that total disabil-
ity must exist for sixty days prior to submission of proof of a total- and
permanent disability does not raise a presumption of permanence on the
expiration of that period. Paul v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., supra. Such
a clause is generally construed to provide "days of grace" to allow in-
vestigation by the insurer. Lewis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra;
Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra; Job v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
133 Cal. App., Supp. 791, 22 P (2d) 607 (1933). But cf. Laup-
heimer v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. io18, 24 S.W.(2d) 158 (193).
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EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE DISPUTES
Plaintiff corporation was engaged in the business of selling and
repairing automobiles. At one time it had a contract with the defendant
union, but the contract had not been renewed and had terminated more
than two years before the present dispute. None of plaintiff's employees
belonged to any union and in fact all had voted not to join the defendant
union, stating that they had no differences with the plaintiff. Just before
the vote was taken, defendant had begun picketing plaintiff under a plan
to picket successively one of thirty such auto dealers each year. The facts
stated by the court do not clearly show the exact purpose of the picketing,
but the opinion indicates that the court felt the object was a closed shop.
The Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County held there was no
labor dispute, and therefore issued a temporary injunction restraining
defendant union from all picketing, and from passing out copies of a
paper containing statements tending to create the false impression that
tiouble existed between plaintiff and his employees. White-Allen Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. Auto Mechanics Local Union No. 314 et al., 27 Ohio Abs.
273, 12 Ohio Op. 288, 3 L.R.R. 205 (Nov. 19, 1938).
In another recent decision, plaintiff corporation, a dealer in new and
used cars, was a member of an association originally composed of one
